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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NELSON CLAYTON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.HAL S. BENNETT, STEWART M.
HANSEN and DONALD HACKING as members of the Department
of Business Regulation of the State
of Utah, DEPARTMENT OF
REGISTRATION and FRANK E.
LEES as Director of the Department of Registration,
Defenda.nts and Respondents.

Case No.
8477

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a suit for a declaratory judgment to determine the constitutionality of the Architect's Licensing
La \V. The District Court held the licensing law to be
constitutional, and this appeal is taken from that judgment.
The present controversy arose out of an examination
given by the Registration Department of the State of

1
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Utah to the plaintiff~appellant, and others, on November
27, 28, 29, and 30, 1951, for the purpose of ascertaining
the qualifications of the examinees to practice the profession of architecture. The examination was conducted
pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, which was formerly Chapter 1,
Title 79. (R. 1, 13.)
Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
purports to create a Registration Department within the
Department of Business Regulation of the State of Utah,
and to set up rules and regulations for the licensing of
members of the various professions, including architects.
Sections 7 and 13 of that Chapter provide for "representative committees'' for each one of the various professions. Each such committee is to be selected from the
practicing members of the particular profession it is to
represent. Each committee is given the sole responsibility for establishing the qualifications to be met by the
applicants desiring licenses in the profession represented,
as well as the sole discretion to set the standards for the
examinations given such applicants.
At the time of the examination herein referred to,
plaintiff-appellant was a duly licensed professional engineer and had degrees in both engineering and architecture from the University of Utah. His educational qualifications to take the examination ,,~ere admitted and accepted· by the Department of Business Regulation. (R.
16.)
After the examination the ''architect's representative committee'' held that plaintiff-appellant had failed
2
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to meet the standards fixed by said committee and he
was refused a license to practice as an archi teet in the
state of Utah. Subsequently, upon the petition of the
plaintiff-appellant, and after a hearing on the matter,
the Department of Business Regulation held that the
"architect's representative committee" had violated
certain of its rules in the conduct of the examination and
granted plaintiff-appellant an opportunity for re-examination under the provisions of section 58-1-16, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. (R. 15, 16.)
Plaintiff-appellant did not avail himself of the opportunity for re-examination, and on June 16, 1953, he
brought. an action in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, state of
Utah, praying for a declaratory judgment construing
Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to be
invalid. Among other things, he contended that there
was an improper delegation of legislative powers insofar
as it places on the" architect's representative committee''
the sole responsibility for establishing the qualifications
for applicants for architects' licenses, and the sole discretion to determine the standards for the examinations
given such applicants. The amendment to the Complaint
further petitioned the court for an injunction permanently enjoining the defendant-respondents from interfering in any manner with the plaintiff-appellant in the
practice of the profession of architecture. (R. 5, 8.)
The cause came on for pre-trial on the 18th day of
October, 1955, and, counsel having stipulated to the facts,
3
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the court entered judgment for the respondents. This
appeal is from the judgment so entered. (R. 16.)

.STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN THE PROFESSION
OF ARCHITECTURE IS A PROPERTY RIGHT
WHICH APPELLANT IS EXTITLED TO PROTECT
BY RECOURSE TO THE COURTS.
POINT II.
AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAS NO POWER
TO PASS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A

LEGISLATIVE ACT.
POINT Ill.
THE DECLARATORY AXD INJUNCTIVE PROCEDURE IS A CORR.ECiT PROCEDURE FOR CHALLENGING THE CONSTITlTTIO~ALITY OF THE
ST~\TUTES IN QlTESTIO~.
POINT IV.
SECTIONS 7 AND 13 OF CH_._\PTER 1, TITLE 58,
UTAH CODE ANNOT~\TED, 1953, CONSTITUTE AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEG.A.TION OF LEGISI1ATIVE POWER.S.
ARGU~IENT

POINT I.
rri-IE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN THE PROFESSION

<)F 1\RCHITE('iTURE IS A PROPERTY RIGHT
WT-IICH APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO PROTECT
BY RE(X)lTRSE TO rrHE COURTS.
4
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In his complaint, appellant alleges that he is competent to engage in the profession of architecture, that he
desires to engage in that profession, that the respondents
are threatening to prosecute him criminally if he does
so without a license, that the statute requiring a license
is void, and that the appellant is being required by the
respondents to forego the practicing of a lawful profession or run the hazards of a criminal prosecution. He
asks the court to enjoin the defendants from enforcing
or attempting to enforce the void statute, so that he can
engage in a lawful occupation.
The right to engage in the profession of architecture
or to engage in practically any other type of business is
a property right protected by the due process clauses of
the State and Federal constitutions. This has been the
consistent ruling of both the Utah Supreme Court and
the United States Supreme Court. A recent pronouncement by the Utah Supreme Court, which collects and cites
many authorities on the subject, is Ruckenbrod v. Salt
Lake County, 102 Utah 548, 113 P. 2d 325. The court said
at page 560 of the Utah Reports:
''The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that citizenship in the United States
carries with it certain privileges which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus an
American citizen has the right 'to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness; and that in the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all
positions are alike open to everyone, and that in
the protection of these rights all are equal before
the law.' Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall 277, 321,
71 U.S. 277, 18 L. Ed. 376."
5
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The Utah Court also quoted with approval from Smith
v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 34 S. Ct. 681, 682, 58 L. Ed. 1129,
as follows:
" 'Life, liberty, property, and the equal protection of the law, grouped together in the Constitution, are so related that the deprivation of any
one of those separate and independent rights may
lessen or extinguish the value of the other three.
Insofar as a man is deprived of the right to labor,
his liberty is restricted, his capacity to earn wages
and acquire property is lessened, and he is denied
the protection which the law affords those who
are permitted to work. Liberty means more than
freedom from servitude, and the constitutional
guaranty is an assurance that the citizen shall be
protected in the right to use his powers of mind
and body in any lawful calling.' ''
The appellant is attempting to practice a lawful calling. His right to practice that calling is a property right
which is entitled to protection from the courts.
POINT II.
AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAS KO POWER
TO PASS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A
LEGISLATIVE ACT.
Section 36 of Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated, provides for a court review of any action taken
by the Department of Business Regulation adversely
affecting any applicant for an . A.rchitect 's License. This
section provides as follo,vs :
'' 58-1-36. Recourse to the Courts. ...~\ny applicant
for or holder of a. license, certificate, permit, student or apprentice card or any person directly
affected and aggrieved hy any ruling of the de6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

partment of registration, may "\\rithin thirty days
after notice of such ruling institute an action in
the district court of the county at the seat of
government, or in the county of the aggrieved
person's residence, against the director in his
official capacity setting out his grievance and his
right to complain. In his answer the director may
set out any matter in justification; and the court
shall determine the issues on both questions of
law and fact and may affirm, set aside or modify
the ruling complained of.''
A review taken pursuant to this section can only embrace
such matters as were within the power of the Administrative Agency to decide. The administrative agency
could not have decided the constitutional questions involved in this action, and therefore, a statutory action
to review that administrative agency's ruling could not
embrace these constitutional questions. This is squarely
set out by our Utah Supreme Court in the case of Eardley
v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 362. That was an action
to review' a decision of the State Engineer. The authority
for court review of the State Engineer's action is contained in Section 73-3-14, U.C.A. 1953. A comparison of
that language with the language of section 58-1-36 (above
quoted) will show that the scope of the review is in both
cases essentially a trial de novo. In the Eardley v. T'erry
case, the Supreme Court said:
'' ... 'Vhen an appeal is taken from the decision
of the State Engineer in such a case, the trial
court is required to determine the same questions
de novo. It determines whether the application
should be approved or rejected and does not fix
the rights of the parties beyond the determination
of that matter. The issues remain the same upon
7
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an appeal to this court. All that the district court
or this court, on appeal from the district court,
is called upon to do is to determine whether the
application should be rejected or approved ... "

*

* *

"It is not for the court, on an appeal from the
decision of the State Engineer rejecting respondent's application to decree to him any waters
which he may be able to obtain by conserving and
increasing the flow of the stream involved. It
should simply determine whether the application
was rightly rejected. In determining that question, the court stands in the same position as the
State Engineer did ... ''

* * *
''As above noted, the proceeding in the district
court was by way of an appeal from the decision
of the state engineer in rejecting respondent's
application to appropriate water. Under the
statute, section 1000-3014, R.S. 1933, when an
appeal is taken from a decision of the state engineer, it is the dut~T of the court to try the cause
de novo. The court had no power in the cause to
decree to the respondent any water he may be
able to obtain in the future by conserving and increasing the flov\T of the streams involved.''

POINT III.
rrHE DECL.A_RATORl~ ~lND INJUNCTIVE PROCEDURE IS A CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTION.A_LITY OF THE
STATUTES IN QUESTION.
rrhere is a. square utah holding to the effect that
decla.ra tory and injunctive procedure is a correct procedure to be follo,ved in challenging statutes of the kind
here under dispute. The case is Broadben,t v. Gibson, 105

8
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Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 939. There the defendant was attempting to challenge the constitutionality of the Sunday Closing Law. The defendants 'vere threatening .to prosecute
plaintiff criminally for keeping his store open on Sunday.
Plaintiff contended that the law was unconstitutional and,
therefore, that he had a right to stay open on Sunday
and to not be harrassed by criminal actions. The plaintiff
filed what he entitled a. petition for a writ of prohibition
to prohibit the various official from molesting his operation. The action was filed in the District Court. On
appeal the propriety of using the writ was challenged.
The Supreme Court devoted a major portion of its decision to the procedure which should be followed in challenging statutes of this type, and held that a suit for a
declaratory judgment or for an injunction would probably have been a better remedy than the writ of prohibition. Its reasoning was that the writ is to be used only
in extraordinary circumstances when no other remedy
is available. The court said that the remedy of a petition
for an injunction was available, and that these forms
(injunction and declaratory judgment) provided adequate remedies. The court then said that since this action
vvas filed in the District Court, it could be treated as
though it had been erroneously designated as a petition
for a writ of prohibition. The court, thereupon, proceeded on appeal as though the petition had been one for
injunctive and declarative relief, and proceeded to consider the constitutionality of the statute. In so ruling,
the Supreme Court said:
''The defendants contend that if the writ may be
issued under the facts presented, injunction is ob9
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tainable. Thus they argue, the petitioners do have
an adequate remedy without the issuance of a writ
of prohibition. While as a general rule the enforcement of a criminal statute would not be
enjoined by injunction (28 Am. Jur. 372) there is
one exception to this rule. An injunction will
issue to restrain the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute when such restraint is necessary
to prevent irreparable damage to property.''
* *
' 'Another limitation to the use of injunction is
suggested in a recent article by Borchard, 'Challenging Penal Statutes by Declaratory Action,'
Vol. 52, Number 3, June, 1943, Yale Law Journal,
in which the thesis is developed that the declaratory judgment is in certain cases superior to injunction for challenging the constitutionality of
penal statutes.''
*

* * *
''In the instant case the action was commenced
in the district court and came to this court by
appeal. It raised substantially the same points as
a petition for an injunction would have done.
Under the holding of Hoffman v. Lewis, 31 Utah
179, 87 P. 167, and Clark v. Bramel, 57 Utah 146,
192 P. 111, ,,~e may disregard the form and consider this as though it "\Yere an appeal from an
order refusing injunctive relief, \\~e believe that
the various factors involved are sufficient to
justify an examination of the merits of the case
on this appeal. We, therefore, proceed to the
merits.''
Of course, the tests for issuing a "\Yrit of prohibition
are similar to those for issuing injunctive relief, in that
in both cases the ordinary remedy at law must be inadequate. In addition, the writ of prohibition generally

10
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would require that there be a lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not required in the case of an injunction.
There have thus been three methods of challenging the
constitutionality of statutes. The ordinary citizen need
not violate a criminal action and run the hazard of criminal punishment in order to determine whether or not he
must comply with a statute, which he thinks is void. The
Supreme Court has upheld in several cases the use of the
writ of prohibition, but in Broadbent v. Gibson, supra,
where the matter was thoroughly examined, the court
indicated that the declaratory procedure or the injunctive
procedure might be better, and in the Broadbent case, the
court turned an action which was entitled as a writ of
prohibition into an injunctive suit, and treated is as a
petition for an injunction and proceeded to determine the
merits of the controversy.
The use of declaratory and injunctive or prohibitive
procedures for testing the constitutionality of statutes is
well accepted and often followed. See W allberg v. Utah
Public Welfare Commission, 115 Utah 242 (declaratory
judgment used to challenge validity of Utah's old age
lien law); Sla.ter v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 456 ( declaratory judgment used to challenge validity of city ordinance prohibiting sale of magazine subscriptions). See
also Masich v. U. S. Smelting, 113 Utah 101 (declaratory
judgment to have plaintiff's right to file common law
action for disability from silicosis); and Gubler v. Uta.h
State Teachers' Retirement Board, et aZ., 113 Utah 118
(declaratory action to determine validity of statute relating to retirement benefits); Grenlund v. Salt Lake City,
11
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113 Utah 284 (declaratory action to determine validity
of Sunday closing law.
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. The amendment to the complaint alleges that plaintiff must either
comply with a void statute or in the alternative run the
risks of criminal prosecution and punishment. This problem was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of

Adolph Coors v. Liquor Control Commission, 99 Utah 26,
105 P. 181. In that case, th~ Supreme Court issued a
writ of prohibition to prohibit the enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute relating to the bottling of beer.
The propriety of using the writ was challenged, with the
State contending that the petitioner had an adequate
remedy. In answer to this the Supreme Court said:
''The corporation here, if forced to its remedy by
appeal, must enter upon a course of conduct
which will subject it to criminal prosecution
throughout the state, subject it to fines, if convicted, and to a possible forfeiture of its license,
if it fails to pay the fines (sections 114, 150 and
161). Should a forfeiture occur, it would mean
the loss of the right to make sales held lawful by
the Commissi~n as well as those held illegal.
Under such circumstances ''e feel that to force
the case through ordinary channels of procedure
''"ronld be an injustice.''
Sinee the statutory procedure for a review of the
Commission's action could not haYe determined the constitutional questions involved, and since plaintiff had no
adequate remedy at la,v, the proper procedure was to
seek declaratory and injunctive relief.

12
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POINT IV.
SECTIONS 7 AND 13 OF CHAPTER 1, TITLE 58,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, CONSTITUTE AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.
The present licensing laws for architects in the state
of Utah have caused a great deal of dissatisfaction. On
various occasions bills have been introduced in the legislature in an attempt to improve the licensing procedure.
For example, such a bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives, H.B. 81, during the 1953 legislative session. In 1954, H.B. 126 was introduced for the purpose of
"enacting a new chapter relating to architects, the qualifications and examination of applicants for licenses to
practice architecture . . . etc. '' This bill, as amended,
passed the House of Representatives and subsequently
passed the Senate. However, in the Senate the bill was
amended, and, while the House voted to concur in the
Senate amendments, it subsequently killed the bill on a
voice vote. The entire matter has now been referred to
the Legislative Council for study.
The particular code sections presently complained
of are cited for the convenience of the Court:
"58-1-7. General duties.-It shall be the duty of
the several representative committees to submit
to the director standards of qualifications for their
respective professions, trades or occupations
requisite in applicants for license, and methods
of examination of applicants. They shall conduct
examinations at the request of the director to
ascertain the qualifications and fitness of applicants to practice the profession, trade or occupa-

13
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tion for which the examination may be held, shall
pass upon the qualifications of applicants for
licenses, certificates or permit and shall submit in
writing their findings and conclusions to the director.''
'' 58-1-13. Action by committee prerequisite to
exercise of certain functions.-The following functions and duties shall be exercised or performed
by the department of registration but only upon
the action a;nd report of the appropriate representative co1nmittee: (Italics added)
(1) Defining for the respective professions, trades
and occupations what shall constitute a school,
college, university, department of university
or other institution of learning as reputable
and in good standing.
(2) Establishing a standard of preliminary education deemed requisite to admission to any
school, college or university.
( 3) Prescribing the standard of qualification
requisite in applicants for licenses before
license shall issue.
( 4) Prescribing rules goYerning applications for
licenses, certificates of registration, permits,
student rards or apprentice cards.
( 5) Providing for a fair and ":holly impartial
method of examination of applicants to determine their qualifications to exercise the respectiYe professions, trades or occupations.
These sections violate the limitations imposed on
the delegation of legislative po,vers in three respects: 1)
The director of regulation can only make provision for
the qualification of architects if a board created from
practicing architects first acts; 2) The licensing power

14
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is delegated to an administrative agency without any
standards having been prescribed; 3) Neither the director nor the architects' representative committee are required to give each applicant uniform and equal protection.
It is well established that the power to issue licenses
may be delegated to an administrative body. However,
there are well defined limitations to this power of delegation. The general law, which is in accord \vith the Utah
decisions, is stated in 53 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec.
15, page 508, as follows :
''Licensing enactments may validly establish a
properly constituted body of officials for administrative purposes and may validly confer appropriate duties on such bodies or officials. The
vesting of duties in administrative officials by an
act or ordinance requiring a license or imposing
an excise or license tax, however, must not amount
to an unlawful delegation of legislative or judicial
power, but in the application of this rule the conferment of merely administrative duties is not
obje-ctionable. Where discretion is to be exercised
by administrative officials, proper standards or
guides for the use of such discretion may, and, as
a general rule, must be established by the enactmen t ... "
In this regard the Utah Supreme Court in the case
of Rowell v. State,. 98 Utah 353, 99 P. 2d 563, stated as
follows:
"In Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E.
579, 584, 71 A.L.R. 604, the court said:
" 'It is a fundamental principle of our system
of government that the rights of men are to be
15
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determined by the law itself, and not by the let or
leave of administrative officers or bureaus. This
principle ought not to be surrendered for convenience or in effect nullified for the sake of expediency. It is the prerogative and function of the
legislative branch of the government, whether
state or municipal, to determine and declare what
the law shall be, and the legislative branch of the
government may not divest itself of this function
or delegate it to executive or administrative officers.'
'' The court further said :
'' 'The majority of the cases lay down the rule
that statutes or ordinances vesting discretion in
administrative officers and bureaus must lay
down rules and tests to guide and control them in
exercise of the discretion granted in order to be
valid ... '
''And in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 239, 35 S. Ct. 387,
392, 59 L. Ed. 552, Ann. Cas. 19160, it is said:
'' 'The legislature must declare the policy of the
la 'v and fix the leg-al principles which are to control in given cases: but an administrative body
may be invested with the power to ascertain the
facts and conditions to which the policy and principles apply.'
''But in the delegation of such authority the legislature must clearly mark the course to be pursued,
and the principles, facts, and purposes to serve
as guide to enable the officer to carrv out, not his
own 'vill or judgment but that of the ·legislature."
It is also clear under the Utah cases that the discretion to prescribe the qualifications and standards must
reside in the administrative agency and not in some
segment or group of society. This was the square holding
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of the case of Revn.e v. Trade Commission., 113 Utah 155,
192 P. 2d 563. In that case an administrative agency
could only act to fix prices if 70 per cent of the barbers
initiated a plan for fixing minimum wages, hours, etc.
The court, in holding such provision unconstitutional,
stated as follows:
'' ... No doubt it can be said that no harm to the
public can occur, as the board stands between the
70% and that public, but, the law was not passed
to grant a class certain benefits so long as the
public was not injured. The law was passed to
protect the public health and safety by authorizing
the establishment of certain prices and hours in
the public interest, and yet there is no way, on
behalf of the public, to initiate such security if
the specified majority of the barbers refuse, for
selfish reasons, to act. No .other group of citizens
may initiate the schedules. The board is not given
power to act for the public upon its own initiative ... "
The discussions in both of the cases cited clearly
demonstrate also that the provision for licensing must
be such that the law itself will govern and so that each
man will be treated equally and identically by the law.
One of the fundamentals of constitutional law is that
by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution of the United States no state may deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. 16 Corpus Juris Secundum at page 995, in discussing this question, states as follows:
"State and municipal legislation is subject to the
constitutional requirement that no state shall deny
the equal protection of the laws to any person
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within its jurisdiction; and it is valid as complying with, or invalid as violating, this requirement
accordingly as it does or does not, within the
sphere of its operation, affect and treat alike,
with equality and uniformity and without arbitrary or unreasonable distinction or discrimination, all persons similarly situated.''
And the following is taken from the same article, 16 Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 1014:
'' ... a state may not, under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with private
business, or impose unreasonable or unnecessary
restrictions thereon. Any classification or discrimination must not be arbitrary or· unreasonable ; and the legislation must not be discriminatory in the sense of applying unequally to persons
pursuing or engaged in the same calling, profession, or business under the same or like conditions
and circumstances. The object of legislation regulating a business must be the public good and not
benefit to individuals or classes~ and a statute
allo,ving one class of persons to engage in what
is presumptively a legitimate business, while denying such right to others, is unconstitutional unless
it is based on some principle ''hich may reasonably
promote the public health, safet~\ or welfare.
''Legislation may be sustainable even where
the enjoyment of certain rights is limited to persons thereafter to be selected by the legislature
or other governmental agency, or at least this is
so "There the legislation fixt.~s standards and vests
an official or department ''ith quasi-judicial
po"\\rer to determine ''Thether the requirements of
the statute haYe been met~ but it is otheru·ise as
to a statule or o~rdin.ance U'hich does n-at prescribe
any urnifo,rnl rules,. conditions, or regulations and
confers on an officer, cornnz.ission, or tribu.nal
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arbitrary authority and discretion to discriminate
in favor of or aga.inst persons engaged in legitimate business or occupation." (Italics added.)
The statutes· in question are fatally defectiye in all
three of the particulars above listed. There is absolutely
no statutory standard prescribed to guide either the
director or the architects' committee in fixing qualifications for persons to be licensed. The statute merely says :
''It shall be the duty of the several representative
committees to submit to the director standards of
qualifications for their respective professions,
trades or occupations requisite in applicants for
license, and methods of examination of applicans
t ... "
As was the situation in the Rowell case, the statute is
utterly barren of any suggested standard of qualification
which the administrative agency is to attempt to adhere
to. Without legislative standard, the administrative
agency can enforce its own will-not that of the legislature. It can have a changing standard of qualification,
changing from applicant to applicant and from day to
day. Further, the act expressly provides that the director
may fix the qualifications and do the other things enumerated in Section 58-1-13 "only upon the action and report
in writing of the appropriate representative committee.''
There is thus no initiative left in the director. lie cannot
initiate standards of qualification, but only may establish
such standards upon the action and report of a committee
of architects. If the board of architects takes no action at
all, the director could not prescribe any qualifications. It
19
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was this very thing which induced the court in the Revne
case to hold that law void.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the statute in question is not constitutional because a) it sets
forth no legislative standards, b) it makes the action of
the director dependent upon the action of a committee of
architects, and c) it has no assurance of equal and identical treatment to each applicant.
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